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REFORMING SEC ALJ PROCEEDINGS
Joanna Howard*
This Note considers the current constitutional challenges to SEC administrative
proceedings and suggests process reforms to enhance fairness for respondents. Chal-
lenges have developed since the Dodd-Frank Act expanded the SEC’s ability to use
administrative proceedings. Arguments that there is a pre-existing flaw in the
method of appointing administrative law judges provide the most potential for suc-
cess. The Tenth Circuit’s December 2016 decision against the SEC in Bandimere
has created a split, diverging from the D.C. Circuit’s analysis of that question in
Lucia.1 Resolution by the Supreme Court may be inevitable. Even if the challengers
do ultimately succeed, this will not improve substantially the fairness or efficiency of
the process. The SEC’s recent rule changes consist of only limited reform of its rules
of practice governing administrative proceedings. This Note suggests addressing
fairness and efficiency issues directly, by reforming the SEC’s criteria for selecting
cases to pursue in front of its administrative law judges, introducing a right of
removal where the SEC alleges fraud, and establishing an affirmative obligation to
ensure that the SEC identifies material and potentially undermining evidence to
respondents.
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INTRODUCTION
The SEC faces a number of challenges to its use of Administra-
tive Law Judges (SEC ALJs), which it has relied on increasingly
since the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) expanded the SEC’s ability to use
administrative proceedings.2 These challenges have ranged from
equal protection claims in specific cases to arguments that the
whole SEC ALJ scheme is unconstitutional. The greatest focus has
been on arguments predicated on the contention that SEC ALJs are
“inferior officers.”3 These arguments are two-fold: first, following
the Supreme Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,4
ALJs, as inferior officers, should not be insulated by more than one
layer of tenure protection. Second, and more convincingly, the ap-
pointments process violates Article II—as inferior officers, SEC
ALJs should only be appointed by the President, the Courts, or a
Head of Department (i.e. the SEC Commissioners); this is not cur-
rently the case.5
It has been a long road for the challengers, some of whom com-
menced their constitutional claims during SEC ALJ proceedings,
making interlocutory applications to the district courts. The chal-
lengers achieved some early success. In Hill and Duka, district
courts in the Northern District of Georgia and Southern District of
New York issued preliminary injunctions temporarily halting the
SEC’s administrative proceedings, finding sufficient likelihood of
success on the merits of the argument that the process for hiring
ALJs at the SEC violated the Appointments Clause.6 But other chal-
lenges were defeated by a jurisdictional hurdle. Certain district
courts, citing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, declined to opine
on the merits of the constitutional claims. Those courts found that
the statutory regime correctly designates the courts of appeal as the
appropriate level of review, but only after the conclusion of the ALJ
proceedings and review by the SEC.7
2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–64 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780).
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. 561 U.S. 477.
5. See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1304–05 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated, 825
F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). SEC ALJs are appointed internally by the SEC’s Office of Admin-
istrative Law Judges. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
6. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1320–21; Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 385 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
7. See, e.g., Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015).
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The district court cases have been circulating for some time. Ap-
peals from interlocutory applications on the jurisdictional issue
were rejected by the courts of appeal in four circuits.8 As of yet, the
Supreme Court has not accepted a petition for certiorari from this
strand of the attack,9 and it is unlikely these appeals will result in an
opinion on the merits of the constitutional claims. But this is not
the only route of challenge. The same constitutional arguments are
also being raised in cases progressing through the statutory re-
gime—through ALJ proceedings, consideration by the SEC
Commissioners, and then on appeal to the federal circuit courts.
The D.C. Circuit has already rejected one such case.10 The Tenth
Circuit, however, recently held that an SEC ALJ was unconstitution-
ally appointed, creating a circuit split ripe for resolution by the
Supreme Court.11
Concerns about the SEC’s processes not addressed by resolution
of these constitutional issues still remain. If the appointments argu-
ment does succeed at the Supreme Court, or if the SEC decides to
amend the appointments process such that it is squarely within con-
stitutional limits,12 this would neither solve the whole problem nor
prevent further challenges. Issues have been raised relating to the
fairness of the administrative process13 and potential bias of ALJs.14
These issues are separate from the constitutional challenges relat-
ing to the appointments and removals process.
The choice of using the administrative process rather than bring-
ing a case in district court is a decision for the SEC alone, and the
use of the administrative process is seen as favoring the SEC.15 This
gives rise to an impression of bias.16 Critics argue the process un-
fairly favors the SEC, which has control over the timescales during
8. Decisions have been issued by appeals courts in Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir.
2015); Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016);
and Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
9. The Supreme Court has denied petitions for writs of certiorari from Bebo and
Gordon Brent Pierce. Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1500
(2016); Pierce v. SEC, 786 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1713 (2016).
10. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
11. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016).
12. Some, however, have suggested this would not be solution enough. See, e.g., Kent
Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 801 (2013).
13. Alan Lieberman, Major Developments in SEC Enforcement, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
SECURITIES LITIGATION, (2015 ed.), 2015 WL 2407608, at *3 (describing problematic aspects
of the procedures “that reward trial by ambush”).
14. See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124444, at *20–22 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
2015).
15. See infra note 145. See also Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-House Judges, WALL
STREET J. (May 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965
803.
16. See, e.g., Eaglesham, supra note 15.
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the investigation phase and ample means to gather evidence
through the use of subpoenas, while respondents in the administra-
tive process are time pressured and have limited discovery tools to
assist with responding to the SEC’s case.17 Critics also claim that
unfairness follows from the lack of an independent arbiter: the de-
cision to commence an investigation, the conduct of the
investigation, the choice of forum, the decision of the ALJ and re-
view by the Commission, are all matters internal to the SEC.18
Judicial review is then available in the circuit courts, but the courts
employ a deferential standard.19
The SEC has reviewed its procedures to some extent, but further
changes could be made to improve the fairness of proceedings and
to ensure that a consistent policy is applied when the SEC deter-
mines whether to use its administrative procedures rather than
filing in federal court. The SEC amended its rules of practice gov-
erning administrative proceedings in July 2016, but these changes
were limited.20 Although respondents have been given longer to
prepare and greater ability to take depositions in complex cases,21
this does not fundamentally alter the balance. Critics compare the
due process protection in the amended rules of practice with the
safeguards available in federal court, and still find the ALJ process
wanting.22
Part I of this Note sets out the background to the SEC ALJ chal-
lenges and the main arguments raised to date. Part I also assesses in
more detail the inferior officer arguments, which gained the most
traction while the cases were percolating through the lower courts.
Part I concludes that the Appointments Clause argument should
succeed, as the Tenth Circuit held in Bandimere.23 Part II suggests
specific reforms to improve the fairness and efficiency of the SEC’s
17. See, e.g., Letter from David M. Zornow, Christopher J. Gunther & Chad E. Silverman,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule: Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice 3
(Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-6.pdf.
18. See id.
19. See Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F. 3d 277, 289–90 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining
that the question for the court is whether there was substantial evidence to support the SEC’s
determination, requiring only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion,” and allowing the SEC’s conclusions “to be set aside only if
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law”
(internal citations omitted)).
20. Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. 50, 212 (July 29,
2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 201).
21. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Rules of Practice for Administrative
Proceedings (July 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-142.html.
22. See Margaret A. Dale & Mark D. Harris, SEC Adopts Amendments to Rules for Administra-
tive Proceedings, 256 N.Y. L.J., Issue 28 Aug. 10, 2016, at 3.
23. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir. 2016).
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administrative process, which may have the added benefit for the
SEC of heading off criticism of its use of ALJs.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SEC ALJS
A. Jurisdictional issues
This Part sets out the background to the SEC ALJ challenges,
including the reasons why these challenges have emerged in recent
times, the arguments raised, and the jurisdictional hurdles that
have delayed judicial consideration of the merits. This Part goes on
to consider in more detail the arguments that have gained the most
traction—challenges based on the contention that SEC ALJs are
“inferior officers,” are impermissibly protected from removal,
and/or are unconstitutionally appointed.
The SEC’s authority to use administrative proceedings was ex-
panded by the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA), which enabled the SEC to
impose penalties on non-regulated persons or entities without
resorting to the federal district courts.24 Prior to the DFA’s enact-
ment, the SEC could only use the administrative procedure for
imposing penalties on regulated persons (those registered with the
SEC).25 This development has been the catalyst for a number of
challenges to the use of SEC ALJs, based on a range of constitu-
tional issues which relate to the method of delegation of decision-
making authority, political accountability for ALJ decisions, and
fairness and due process concerns largely focused on the SEC’s dis-
cretion to choose the ALJ process over proceeding in district court.
Challengers have argued that:
• Congress’s delegation of authority to the SEC to use its ad-
ministrative proceedings violates the delegation doctrine
under Article I of the Constitution;26
• the SEC’s administrative proceedings violate Article II of the
Constitution, as the ALJs are inferior officers under Article
24. See Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–64 (2010); see also Duka v.
SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297,
1301–02 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
25. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1302 (“[T]he earlier version of the statute allowed the SEC
to pursue unregistered individuals like Plaintiff for civil penalties only in federal court where
these individuals could invoke their Seventh Amendment right to jury trial.”).
26. Id. at 1305.
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II and are protected from removal by two layers of tenure
protection;27
• the method used by the SEC to appoint its ALJs is in viola-
tion of the Appointments Clause of Article II of the
Constitution, again because the ALJs are inferior officers;28
• the use of ALJs by the SEC violates the Seventh Amendment,
as the SEC has the sole discretion to determine whether a
subject of enforcement proceedings will be entitled to a jury
trial;29 and
• the SEC’s use of ALJs violates equal protection or due pro-
cess rights.30
These arguments have been raised in the federal district courts
prior to the completion of the SEC’s administrative proceedings on
an interlocutory basis.31 A number of these challenges, however,
have been dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by the
federal courts. As summarized by the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Bebo, the relevant jurisdictional question is whether
Congress intended to provide an exclusive statutory review scheme.
In relation to an SEC ALJ’s decision, this involves appeal from a
final order of the Commission to the relevant circuit court.32 In Free
Enterprise, the Supreme Court decided the review scheme set out in
the Securities and Exchange Act was not intended to be exclusive in
all cases and applied a three-factor analysis. The Court explained
that “it would not presume that Congress intended to strip district
courts of jurisdiction where (1) a finding of preclusion could fore-
close all meaningful judicial review, (2) the suit was wholly
27. Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015); Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1304; Duka,
103 F. Supp. 3d at 388; Tilton v. SEC, 15-CV-2472 (RA), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *5–6
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015).
28. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1305; Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100999, at *2, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015); Tilton, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *5.
29. See, e.g., Hill, 114 F. Supp. at 1304–05.
30. Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Bebo, 799 F.3d at 768; Chau
v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Jarkesy v. SEC, 48 F. Supp. 3d 32, 35 (D.D.C.
2014).
31. Constitutional challenges may also reach the circuit courts on petition for review
from orders of ALJs and the SEC pursuant to the statutory review scheme. See, e.g., Raymond
J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
32. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 768–69. The relevant circuit court is either the D.C. Circuit or the
Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of business. 15
U.S.C. § 78(y) (2012).
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collateral to a statute’s review provisions, and (3) the plaintiffs’
claims were outside the agency’s expertise.”33
Bebo argued the application of this test in Free Enterprise sup-
ported her position that the federal district court could hear broad
constitutional attacks.34 The Seventh Circuit rejected Bebo’s argu-
ments on the basis that the Supreme Court’s further guidance in
Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury35 provided a narrower reading of the stan-
dard. Specifically with regard to the first and third Free Enterprise
factors, the existence of a facial constitutional challenge did not on
its own lead to the conclusion that the district courts had jurisdic-
tion. Nor was the court persuaded by the inability of the SEC to
hold §929P(a) of the DFA unconstitutional, or the possibility that
the constitutional issues fell outside the agency’s expertise.36 Mean-
ingful judicial review in the circuit courts was not precluded by the
fact-finding capacities of the ALJs or SEC, even if fact-finding is
more limited than in the district courts.37 And the possibility that
the constitutional claims might never be heard by an Article III
court (if Bebo prevailed in the administrative proceeding) did not
mean the statutory review scheme was inadequate.38
The Seventh Circuit did not determine the second Free Enterprise
factor—whether Bebo’s constitutional claims were wholly collateral
to the statutory review scheme—and there is a lack of consistency in
how courts have answered this question.39 But the court did catego-
rize the approaches of the various district courts involved in
considering jurisdiction questions in challenges to SEC ALJs. The
first approach it identified was based on the lack of connection be-
tween the merits of the constitutional claim and the allegations
against the individual, which the court described as the relationship
of claims approach and led to findings that the district courts had
jurisdiction to hear the distinct constitutional claims in Hill, Duka,
and Gupta. The second approach centered on whether the constitu-
tional claims were merely brought as a vehicle to challenge the
agency action during the proceeding, which the court described as
the mechanism of review approach and led to the conclusion that
subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking in both Tilton and in the
33. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 769 (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 489 (2010), which in turn cited Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200,
212–13 (1994)).
34. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 770–71.
35. 132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012).
36. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 773.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 774.
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lower court in Bebo.40 The court considered that both approaches
had support, but that this factor would not be determinative.41
Although the court did not determine whether the constitutional
issue was wholly collateral, the court decided there was still fairly
discernable Congressional intent that Bebo should proceed
through the statutory scheme because it did provide meaningful
judicial review.42 The key difference between Bebo’s situation and
that of the petitioner in Free Enterprise was that there was already an
enforcement proceeding ongoing that would, if the outcome was
unfavorable to Bebo, give rise to a right of appeal. This was not the
exceptional case where a plaintiff had to risk a violation in order to
obtain a right of review under the statutory scheme.43 The court
rejected Bebo’s counter-argument that being subjected to an un-
constitutional proceeding itself precluded meaningful review.
Relevant precedent indicated the expense and disruption of de-
fending administrative proceedings did not entitle a plaintiff to
pursue judicial review in the district courts.44 Rather than opening
the floodgates across administrative law claims, the court held dis-
trict court review should only be available in exceptional cases.45
The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s judg-
ment, dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision was soon followed by the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court’s confirmation that the D.C. District Court lacked
jurisdiction to hear a due process and equal protection challenge to
the SEC’s decision to use an ALJ in Jarkesy.46 The Second Circuit
also rejected jurisdiction in Tilton,47 as did the Eleventh Circuit in
Hill.48
The district courts had, however, accepted jurisdiction to hear
challenges to SEC ALJs in three notable cases: Hill (in the Northern
District of Georgia), Duka, and Gupta (both in the Southern District
of New York). Hill and Duka were both able to obtain preliminary
injunctions on the basis that there was sufficient likelihood that
40. Id. at 773–74.
41. Id. at 774.
42. Id.
43. Id. Bebo’s case can be contrasted with the petitioners in Free Enterprise, who chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board prior to the
completion of an investigation, see Bebo, 799 F.3d at 769, and to the case of McNary v. Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991), in which undocumented aliens could only obtain
judicial review in a court of appeals by voluntarily surrendering themselves for deportation.
44. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 775.
45. Id.
46. Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
47. Tilton v. SEC, 824, F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2016).
48. Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2016).
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their arguments—which stated that the SEC ALJs were inferior of-
ficers appointed in violation of Article II—would succeed. Gupta’s
challenge, based on an equal protection argument, passed the mo-
tion to dismiss stage but did not progress further after the SEC
moved its case to the district court.49 Both strands raise important
issues: (1) if the appointments argument is correct, it has broad
consequences for the use of ALJs by the SEC and potentially other
agencies; and (2) while the equal protection argument may be fact
specific, it raises questions about the SEC’s policy in deciding
whether to institute proceedings administratively or by filing in dis-
trict court.
The challengers’ arguments have also been percolating through
the statutory route of review. Circuit courts have now begun to con-
sider the substance of the claims. The challengers’ ability to
develop their arguments and react to counter-arguments during
the earlier proceedings has been useful, and the issues have now
been narrowed. This Part goes on to explain the arguments that
have had the most traction to date, and to identify the issue most
likely to be considered by the Supreme Court.
B. Inferior officers
The Appointments Clause in Article II of the Constitution gives
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the au-
thority to appoint certain named officers, and “all other Officers of
the United States.”50 Separately, the Excepting Clause gives Con-
gress the authority to vest the appointment of “such inferior
officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”51 Challengers to the
SEC’s administrative proceedings characterize SEC ALJs as “inferior
officers,” while the government maintains that ALJs exercise insuffi-
cient authority to be designated as such.52 Challengers’ subsequent
arguments regarding appointments and removals are contingent
upon the “inferior officer” question—if SEC ALJs are “inferior of-
ficers,” then challengers can argue that their appointment must
comport with Article II, and that any protection they have against
being removed from office must not impede the President’s ability
49. See SEC v. Gupta, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102274, at *1, 5 n.3 (July 17, 2013).
50. U.S. CONST. art. II.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1317–18 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
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to perform his constitutional duty.53 These subsequent questions
raise issues relating to the delegation of authority to, and accounta-
bility over decision-making by, ALJs and the SEC.
SEC ALJs should be considered inferior officers for the purposes
of Article II because this accords with existing Supreme Court pre-
cedent. Yet there is some debate on this issue, as reflected in two
decisions involving challenges against judges whose roles had been
created by statute. In Freytag, the Supreme Court held that a Special
Trial Judge appointed by the Tax Court was an inferior officer, and
in Landry, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals applied Freytag in deter-
mining that an ALJ used by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) was not.54 The SEC’s position is that Landry
was correctly decided, and that the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning should
be extended to an analysis of the status of SEC ALJs, a view ac-
cepted by the D.C. Circuit, which is bound by Landry.55 There is,
however, another reading of Freytag. The concurrence in Landry ex-
plained that the majority had misunderstood the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Freytag. On this reading, explained in more detail be-
low, it appears clear that SEC ALJs are inferior officers.56 Indeed,
the Tenth Circuit adopted this approach in Bandimere.57
First, by way of background, it is important to understand the
earlier cases in order to see the inconsistency that emerges. Freytag
concerned a challenge by several petitioners whose tax arrange-
ments had been reviewed by a Special Tax Judge (STJ), who
concluded that a tax shelter scheme resulting in federal income tax
deductions of approximately $1.5 billion in losses had consisted of
sham transactions.58 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed.59 On appeal, the Supreme Court held, as a preliminary
issue, that the STJ, who had been appointed by the Chief Judge of
the Tax Court, was an inferior officer.60
Congress had authorized the Tax Court to appoint STJs to assist
by hearing certain specified proceedings (in which the STJs could
hear, report, and rule on a case), and could also hear “any other
proceeding which the chief judge may designate.”61 In this latter
53. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010);
see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
54. Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991); Landry v. FDIC,
204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
55. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 284–89 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
56. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1142–43 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
57. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016).
58. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 871.
59. Id. at 872.
60. Id. at 882.
61. I.R.C. § 7443A(b)(4).
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category—which had applied in the petitioners’ case—the STJ only
had authority to hear the case and prepare proposed findings and
an opinion.62 In evaluating the claim, the Court’s starting point was
the standard stated in Buckley v. Valeo, that “[a]ny appointee exercis-
ing significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is
an ‘Officer of the United States’, and must, therefore, be appointed
in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of [Article II].”63 More spe-
cifically, the Court noted prior decisions holding that STJs are
“inferior officers,”64 and agreed with those decisions on the basis
that (1) the office of STJ was established by law, and that the duties,
salary, and means of appointment were provided in the underlying
statute, and therefore STJs could be contrasted with other more
episodic appointments such as the role of special master; and (2)
STJs exercise significant discretion by taking testimony, ruling on
the admissibility of evidence, and enforcing discovery orders.65
In the alternative, even if the duties of the STJ were less signifi-
cant, the Court would have relied on the authority of STJs to render
the decisions of the Tax Court in specified proceedings. The pro-
ceedings at issue in Freytag fell under the category of “any other
proceedings” designated by the Chief Judge, which meant the STJ
only had authority to recommend rather than decide.66 But in rela-
tion to the proceedings specified by statute in which STJs had
decision-making authority, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
conceded the STJs were acting as inferior officers exercising inde-
pendent authority. The Court did not divide the role of the STJs in
two—STJs sitting in specified proceedings versus STJs sitting on a
case designated by the Chief Judge—as suggested by the petition-
ers. If the STJs were inferior officers in relation to specified
proceedings, they were inferior officers for all purposes.67
The Court in Freytag went on to determine that the STJs were
validly appointed by the Chief Tax Judge because the Tax Court,
although created under Article I rather than Article III, was a
“court of law” for the purposes of the Appointments Clause.68 The
judgment of the Court rejected the petitioners’ contention that the
62. § 7443A(c).
63. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881 (internal citation omitted).
64. Including the Second Circuit’s decision in Samuels, Kremer & Co. v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 930 F.2d 975, 985 (2d Cir. 1991); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
65. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
66. Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 904 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990); see
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 873.
67. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
68. Id. at 891.
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Tax Court was a department within the meaning of Article II, rely-
ing on the Court’s definition of that term “for more than a century”
as referring to “a part or division of the executive government, as
the Department of State, or of the Treasury, expressly created and
given the name of a department.”69 Justice Scalia (joined by Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) concurred in the judgment, but
disagreed on this point, finding that the Tax Court, as a free-stand-
ing, self-contained entity in the Executive Branch, was indeed a
Department.70
The concurrence in Freytag reserved the right of the Court to de-
termine that independent agencies, including the SEC, also had
the status of a Department, even though it consists of a body “at the
farthest remove from Cabinet status.”71 In reaching this conclusion,
however, Justice Scalia relied on the notion that the STJs were exer-
cising executive power, noting in passing that “[t]oday, the Federal
Government has a corps of administrative law judges numbering
more than 1,000, whose principal statutory function is the conduct
of adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
They are all executive officers.”72
Nine years later, and despite the conclusions of the Supreme
Court in Freytag (and the concurrence’s comments), the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decided that an administrative law judge who
had recommended a decision to the FDIC Board was not an infer-
ior officer for the purposes of Article II’s Appointments Clause.73
Landry concerned a challenge to an ALJ’s recommendation that led
to an FDIC Board decision to remove Landry from his position at
First Guaranty Bank and prohibit him from participation in the op-
erations of a federally insured depository institution.74 The main
issue for review was Landry’s argument that the ALJ had not been
appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause.75 Landry
argued that the ALJ was an inferior officer, but not appointed by
the head of a “department.”76 The ALJ in question, appointed
under the Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act (FIRREA),77 had been hired by the Office of Thrift Supervision
69. Id. at 886 (internal citations omitted).
70. Id. at 915, 922.
71. Id. at 916.
72. Id. at 910 (internal citations omitted).
73. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
74. Id. at 1128.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1130.
77. Id.
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and assigned to the case by the Office of Financial Institution Adju-
dication.78 The FDIC initially opposed the Appointments Clause
argument on the basis that the ALJ had been appointed by a de-
partment (conceding that the ALJ was an inferior officer). But the
FDIC switched positions, waiving its defense that the ALJ had been
appointed by a “department” without explanation, and thus the
question became whether the ALJ was an inferior officer.79
The Landry court’s analysis began by conveying the lack of clarity
around the definition of inferior officer. “The line between ‘mere’
employees and inferior officers is anything but bright.”80 The court
referred to the standard in Buckley v. Valeo: “[i]n attempting to clar-
ify the inquiry, the Court has often said that “any appointee
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States is an ‘Officer of the United States.’”81 The court further ex-
plained that the application of that standard requires assessment of
the roles of others in the precedent.82
The Landry court selected Freytag as the most analogous case, al-
though it distinguished the Supreme Court’s holding that the STJ
was an inferior officer. First, the court drew a distinction between
the STJ and ALJ in terms of the availability of review and deference
given to their recommendations. The Tax Court was required to
defer to the STJ’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, whereas
the ALJ’s findings were subject to de novo review.83
Second, of the three reasons relied on by the Court in Freytag
(statutory basis for the office, significant discretion, and, in the al-
ternative, authority to make a decision), the court in Landry
selected the last as being the most important:
[T]he Court relied on authority of the STJs not matched by
the ALJs here. In particular, the Court noted that STJs have
the authority to render the final decision of the Tax Court in
declaratory judgment proceedings and in certain small-
amount tax cases. But the ALJs here can never render the deci-
sion of the FDIC.84
The court in Landry did agree that many of the features noted in
Freytag were present—namely, the statutory basis for the office and
78. Id. at 1143.
79. Id. at 1133 n.2, 1143.
80. Id. at 1132.
81. Id. at 1133 (internal citation omitted).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1134 (internal citations omitted).
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authority to exercise significant discretion.85 And the court consid-
ered that the power to render a final decision played an “uncertain”
role in the Supreme Court’s reasoning.86 “[T]he Court introduced
mention of the STJs power to render final decisions with something
of a shrug.”87 But the court went on to characterize the power to
render a final decision as being critical to the holding in Freytag:
“[n]onetheless, in another way the Court laid exceptional stress on
the STJ’s final decision making power.”88 The majority explained
that the Court in Freytag had emphasized that the powers of the STJ
proved beyond doubt that the STJ was an inferior officer—and
those powers were not present in Landry’s case.
All this explanation [of decision making authority] would have
been quite unnecessary if the purely recommendatory powers
were fatal in themselves. Accordingly, we believe that the STJs’
power of final decision in certain classes of cases was critical to
the Court’s decision. As the ALJs hired pursuant to §916 of
FIRREA have no such powers, we conclude that they are not
inferior officers.89
Judge Randolph’s concurrence in Landry explained the problem
with the majority’s application of Freytag. Randolph rejected both
attempts to distinguish Freytag. First, he noted that the level of def-
erence argument was irrelevant, as this emanated from an internal
rule of procedure, and that the rule had been irrelevant to the Su-
preme Court’s analysis in Freytag.90 The fact that the ALJ’s work was
subject to review did not mean they were not inferior officers. In
support, Randolph cited a further Supreme Court case, Edmond v.
United States, 520 US 651 (1997), in which the Court stated: “[w]e
think it evident that ‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is
directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed
by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the
Senate.”91
Second, the concurrence felt that the third reason given in sup-
port of the Court’s decision in Freytag (decision-making authority)
85. Id. at 1133–34.
86. Id. at 1133.
87. Id. at 1134.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1141–42.
91. Id. at 1142.
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was clearly an alternative holding.92 The Court in Freytag had al-
ready concluded the STJ was an inferior officer before reaching
that reason. This interpretation was confirmed by the Supreme
Court’s approval of a Second Circuit decision which held that a spe-
cial trial judge was an inferior officer without referring to decision-
making authority as a relevant factor.93 Randolph also compared
the role of ALJs with magistrate judges, who have long been held to
be inferior officers who have a recommendatory role.94 The concur-
rence could not conclude the ALJ was properly appointed, as the
FDIC had waived its argument in defense that the ALJ was ap-
pointed by a “department.” Nevertheless, the concurrence
concluded that there was no prejudice to Landry, as there had been
a thorough review by the FDIC; any error was harmless.95
A close reading of these cases therefore reveals that Landry was
wrongly decided. It is apparent, as Judge Randolph described, that
the majority applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Freytag in-
correctly, minimizing the similarities between the ALJ and STJ, and
thereby avoiding a finding that the ALJ was an inferior officer.
This has implications for the current challenges to the SEC ALJs,
as courts have a sound basis to conclude that SEC ALJs are inferior
officers. The Tenth Circuit took this approach in Bandimere, finding
that Freytag controlled the result of the case.96 The Court found the
characteristics identified as relevant in Freytag were present with re-
spect to the SEC ALJ97—the role was established by law in the
Administrative Procedure Act, and there is a statutory basis for the
SEC ALJ’s duties, salaries, and means of appointment.98 The court
also concluded that the SEC ALJs exercised “significant discretion”
in performing “important functions” commensurate with the STJs’
functions described in Freytag.”99
The dissent in Bandimere (and the D.C. Circuit, which reached
the contrary result in Lucia), stressed that the nature of the SEC
ALJs’ discretion can be distinguished from Freytag, following the
reasoning in Landry.100 The Tenth Circuit’s opinion rejects that po-
sition by analyzing the nature and extent of discretion found in the
92. Id.
93. Id. (internal citation omitted).
94. Id. at 1143.
95. Id. at 1143–44.
96. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2016).
97. Id. at 1179.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1194–98 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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ALJs’ functions, rather than following the Landry court’s ap-
proach.101 The Tenth Circuit’s opinion includes a catalogue of key
actions within the ALJs’ authority:
authority to shape the administrative record by taking testi-
mony, regulating document production and depositions,
ruling on the admissibility of evidence, ruling on dispositive
and procedural motions, issuing subpoenas, and presiding
over trial-like hearings. . . . [making] credibility findings to
which the SEC affords “considerable weight” during agency re-
view. . . . [issuing] initial decisions that declare respondents
liable and impos[ing] sanctions. . . . enter[ing] default judg-
ments, and otherwise steer[ing] the outcome of proceedings
by holding and requiring attendance at settlement confer-
ences. They also have authority to set aside, make permanent,
limit, or suspend temporary sanctions that the SEC itself has
imposed.102
The Tenth Circuit found it was not necessary for an inferior of-
ficer to have final decision-making power, even though it could be
relevant to the analysis, noting that the Supreme Court “did not
make final decision-making power the essence of inferior officer
status. Nor do we.”103
The D.C. Circuit has issued a contrary decision on the constitu-
tionality of SEC ALJs consistent with Landry, in Lucia.104 This creates
a circuit split. However, the Tenth Circuit is not the only court to
conclude that SEC ALJs are inferior officers. In Hill and Duka, the
district courts also relied on Freytag to reach the same result.105 Ad-
ditionally, Judge Randolph of the D.C. Circuit, who did not sit on
the panel in Lucia, subsequently reaffirmed the view he expressed
in Landry in a separate case involving a challenge to a decision of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, opining that an ALJ
hearing the case was an “inferior officer” and that this conclusion
should have followed from Freytag.106
101. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1179–82.
102. Id. at 1179–81.
103. Id. at 1184.
104. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 284–89 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
105. Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1317–19 (N.D. Ga. 2015); Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357
(RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100999, at *17–18, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015).
106. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 55–56 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (also noting that the ALJ
had been assigned to the case by the SEC’s Chief Administrative Law Judge, pursuant to an
agreement between the CFPB and the SEC). The majority’s main holding in PHH Corp. was
that the structure of the CFPB is unconstitutional. This may make Supreme Court review of
the case more likely. En banc rehearing is scheduled in both PHH Corp. and Lucia on May 24,
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Further, the dissent in Free Enterprise concluded that the 1,584
ALJs it had identified in over 25 administrative agencies were infer-
ior officers.107 As Barnett notes, the dissenters in Free Enterprise plus
the concurrence in Freytag considered that ALJs were “executive of-
ficers,” suggesting that half of the current Supreme Court would
consider SEC ALJs to be inferior officers, if the current challenges
reach that level of review.108
The addition of a ninth Justice to the Supreme Court could af-
fect things significantly. At the time this Note went to print, Judge
Gorsuch had been nominated and his confirmation hearing had
been scheduled to begin on March 20, 2017.109 His views on the
SEC ALJ question are at this time unknown, but his discussion of
the separation of powers and the administrative state in an unre-
lated decision issued last year indicates he may not be the most
sympathetic towards the SEC’s arguments. In a concurrence that
accompanied his own opinion, Judge Gorsuch commented at
length on the founders’ design and what he saw as pressures cre-
ated by judicial deference to agency interpretations.110 It is this type
of concern regarding separation of powers that feeds directly into
the challengers’ arguments that SEC ALJs are unconstitutionally ap-
pointed, as explained further below.
C. Removals
The challengers, based on the premise that SEC ALJs are inferior
officers, initially argued that they are unconstitutionally protected
from removal by the President. This argument attempted to track
the reasoning in another Supreme Court decision, Free Enterprise.111
In that case, the Supreme Court determined that the combination
of removal protection over members of the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board contravened the Constitution’s
2017, and the D.C. Circuit has requested that the parties in PHH Corp. brief them on how a
decision that the ALJ in Lucia was an inferior officer would affect the outcome in PHH.
Order Granting Rehearing En Banc, 839 F.3d 1; Order Granting Rehearing En Banc, 832
F.3d 277.
107. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 542–43, 586
(2010).
108. Barnett, supra note 12, at 800 n.12 (citing the dissent in Free Enterprise—Breyer, J.,
joined by Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J. & Sotomayor, J.; and the concurrence in Freytag—Scalia J.,
joined by O’Connor, J., Kennedy, J. & Souter, J.).
109. Richard Pérez-Peña, Hearing for Neil Gorsuch, Supreme Court Nominee, Is Set for
March, (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-su-
preme-court-senate-hearing.html.
110. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016).
111. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 477.
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separation of powers.112 Although the Court had previously upheld
good cause tenure protections for inferior officers whose superiors
were removable at will by the President,113 the question of whether
the combination of tenure protections at two levels was permissible
under Article II was one of first impression.114 The good cause re-
movals protections withdrew “from the President any decision on
whether that good cause exists . . . . The result is a Board that is not
accountable to the President, and a President who is not responsi-
ble for the Board.”115 The Court held the provisions prevented the
President from ensuring that the laws were faithfully executed, and
prevented him from being held responsible for a Board member’s
breach of faith.116
Challengers have argued that the SEC ALJs are also subject to
two layers of good cause protection and, following Free Enterprise,
such protection is impermissible.117 This argument was rejected by
the district court in Duka118 and doubted in Hill.119 The court in
Duka focused on the functional nature of the test in Free Enterprise.
The court determined that Free Enterprise did not stand for as broad
a proposition as Duka contended.120 The question was whether the
ALJs could be seen as infringing on the President’s executive au-
thority and, as the role of the ALJ was adjudicatory in nature, the
court was unconvinced the removal restrictions were unconstitu-
tional; it therefore held that Duka had failed to establish a
likelihood of success on the merits of her claim for a preliminary
injunction.121
To the extent that there is uncertainty about the application of
Free Enterprise, this is unlikely to affect the outcome of the SEC ALJ
challenges, as the arguments based on the appointment of ALJs is
more straightforward, given that SEC ALJs are not appointed in ac-
cordance with Article II.
Even if challengers were to succeed on the removals argument, a
revised removals process would not be helpful to those subject to
112. Id. at 485, 492 (members of the Board could only be removed on limited good cause
grounds by the Commissioners, who in turn could only be removed by the President for
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”).
113. Id. at 493–94 (citing United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) and Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
114. Id. at 495.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 496.
117. See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
118. Id.
119. Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1319 n.12 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
120. Duka, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 395–96.
121. Id.
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SEC administrative proceedings in future. As the court in Duka
noted, if the second layer of tenure protection were removed, this
would undermine the ALJs’ adjudicatory role by removing a provi-
sion that helped guarantee their independence. Without that
protection, the ALJs would be more susceptible to influence from
the parties or other officials within the agency.122
D. Appointments
The second argument following the assertion that SEC ALJs are
inferior officers is that they are not appropriately appointed under
Article II. This argument is straightforward and has had the most
traction to date. It was on this basis that the Tenth Circuit decided
in Bandimere’s favor, and that the plaintiffs in Duka and Hill were
successful in obtaining preliminary injunctions.123
Article II permits Congress to vest the appointment of inferior
officers in “the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.”124 SEC ALJs, however, are appointed by the
SEC’s Office of Administrative Law Judges, “with input from the
Chief Administrative Law Judge, human resource functions, and
the Office of Personnel Management.”125 The Tenth Circuit sum-
marized the process as follows: “the OPM screens applicants,
proposes three finalists to the SEC, and then leaves it to somebody
at the agency to pick one.” Once a court accepts that SEC ALJs are
inferior officers, it will therefore inevitably conclude that the ap-
pointments process violates Article II. The court in Hill was the first
to reach this conclusion in June 2015.
That decision was followed swiftly by the court in Duka, and the
sequence of events is worth noting. The parties in Duka returned to
court (in the Southern District of New York) after Duka’s removals
122. Id. at 396 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513–14 (1978)). The court also
quoted an article written by Justice Kagan (when she was a visiting Professor at Harvard Law
School), in which she argued generally in favor of the enhanced methods of presidential
control of agency actions that have developed, but not in administrative proceedings because
“[i]n this context [of agency adjudication], presidential participation in administration, of
whatever form, would contravene procedural norms and inject an inappropriate influence
into the resolution of controversies . . . . The consequence here is to disallow the President
from disrupting or displacing the procedural, participatory requirements associated with
agency adjudication, thus preserving their ability to serve their intended, special objectives.”
Id. (citing Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2363 (2001)).
123. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1319; Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 106605, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2015).
124. U.S. CONST. art. II.
125. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1303.
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argument was rejected by the district court.126 Duka had filed an
Amended Complaint dated June 10, 2015, which included a new
ground of challenge based on the Appointments clause.127 This
came two days after the decision in Hill. The SEC then brought a
motion to dismiss. After finding the SEC’s ALJs to be inferior of-
ficers (following the reasoning in Freytag),128 the court denied the
SEC’s motion and gave them a period of grace within which to cure
any violation of the Appointments Clause.129 The SEC took no such
action, and the court awarded Duka a preliminary injunction, find-
ing that the appointment of SEC ALJs was likely unconstitutional.130
Notwithstanding the SEC’s appeal to the Second Circuit, the par-
ties returned to the district court to consider the SEC’s motion to
stay the preliminary injunction pending its appeal.131 The court de-
nied the SEC the relief it sought, commenting in relation to the
merits that “respectfully, the SEC will not, in the Court’s view, be
able to persuade the appellate courts that ALJs are not ‘inferior
officers.’”
Therefore, the government rejected its opportunity to cure the
Article II violation and has maintained an aggressive litigation
stance. This is no doubt in part because the government fears the
wide-ranging implications of accepting that ALJs are inferior of-
ficers, which would have consequences for ALJs not just within the
SEC, but potentially for many other agencies. Justice Breyer, dis-
senting in Free Enterprise, noted that “the Federal Government relies
on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate administrative matters in over 25 agen-
cies.”132 It could be argued that any change in position would need
to be accompanied by a consistent approach across agencies. This
issue was seized upon by the dissent in Bandimere as being particu-
larly important, although the court’s opinion noted that these
broad questions had not been presented or briefed, and the con-
currence was skeptical of the dissent’s conclusions, stating that “the
dissent’s dire predictions about hypothetical consequences of the
majority’s holding are exaggerated.”133
126. Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100999 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
3, 2015).
127. Id. at *2.
128. Id. at *5.
129. Id. at *8.
130. Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124444, at *65,
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 17, 2015) (Ex. C, Order of the Court dated Aug. 12, 2015).
131. Id.
132. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 542–43
(2010).
133. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1188; Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1189–90 (Briscoe, J., concur-
ring); Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1199–1201 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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But what prevented the government from cutting its losses and
revising the ALJ appointment process at an early stage, especially
since Supreme Court precedent does not support its interpreta-
tion? Perhaps the government considered that, even with the risk
that a challenge could succeed, the arguments would be extin-
guished over time. Four circuits denied jurisdiction to hear
interlocutory appeals from district court decisions, so those consti-
tutional challenges were delayed.134 Cases brought following the
conclusion of administrative proceedings have now started to per-
colate through the system, and it will take time for these issues to be
considered fully, potentially in other circuits. But the Tenth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Bandimere, which creates a circuit split with the
D.C. Circuit, increases the likelihood of review by the Supreme
Court. The SEC may yet have to alter its appointment process.
The Tenth Circuit emphasized the importance of the appoint-
ments clause issue from a structural perspective, in that the clause
separates power between different branches, and also “promotes
public accountability by identifying the public officials who appoint
officers.”135 But an additional wrinkle to the SEC’s ALJ conundrum
is that if the appointment of SEC ALJs did clearly comport with
Article II, this would not necessarily benefit persons subject to SEC
administrative proceedings. If the ALJs were appointed by the Com-
mission as head of the department, this would not address concerns
over the partiality of ALJs.136 It has also been suggested that ap-
pointment by the President might create due process concerns of
impartiality.137 This tends to suggest that appointment by the courts
of law would be most appropriate, particularly in light of the adjudi-
catory role of ALJs.138 This does, however, present a substantial
conceptual change, and would require significant statutory
amendment.
134. Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015); Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir.
2015); Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-2103, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9970 (2d Cir. Jun. 1, 2016); Hill v.
SEC, No. 15-12831, No. 15-13738, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10946 (11th Cir. June 17, 2016).
135. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2016).
136. For example, in Duka, Judge Berman noted there had been allegations of undue
pressure on ALJs to make SEC-favorable rulings, and hoped that the “flap at the SEC” would
be duly investigated. Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB)(SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124444, at
*20–22 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015).
137. Barnett, supra note 12, at 825–27.
138. Barnett proposes such an inter-branch appointment remedy, suggesting the D.C.
Circuit court would be an appropriate appointer. Id. at 832.
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II. PROCESS REFORM
A. Developing the law
Even if the challengers succeed in their constitutional argu-
ments, this will not change some of the objections that have been
raised against ALJs in the current debate. These concerns have
come from various sides, most notably Judge Rakoff. In a keynote
address at the PLI Securities Regulation Institute in November
2014, Judge Rakoff summarized various problems with the SEC’s
increased use of administrative proceedings.139 This critique en-
compassed procedural differences with the process used in the
federal courts, including limitations on discovery, admissibility of
evidence precluded by the Federal Rules of Evidence such as hear-
say, and the absence of a jury trial.140 This comparison is relevant, as
the SEC has discretion to bring its cases either in federal district
court or by using its administrative proceedings.141 It is therefore
the SEC’s choice to proceed in federal court with significant proce-
dural tools and protections, or to limit these safeguards by
proceeding before an ALJ.
Importantly, Judge Rakoff commented that the increased use of
ALJs “hinders the balanced development of the securities laws,”
which he explained was particularly significant in light of the judge-
made law which has developed under the anti-fraud provisions of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts.142 The SEC might be more likely to bring
novel or complex cases under its administrative procedures where
its chances of success are higher and where its interpretations
would not be subject to de novo review. According to Judge Rakoff,
“[w]hatever one might say about the SEC’s quasi-judicial functions,
this is unlikely, I submit, to lead to as balanced, careful, and impar-
tial interpretations as would result from having those cases brought
in federal court.”143
In attempting to address the procedural differences with federal
court process, the SEC has adopted new rules to amend certain pro-
cedures, including adjusting certain time limits and permitting
depositions as part of discovery.144 This may improve matters for
139. Judge Jed S. Rakoff, PLI Securities Regulation Keynote Address: Is the SEC Becom-
ing a Law Unto Itself? (Nov. 5, 2014), https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/
rakoff-pli-speech.pdf.
140. Id. at 7.
141. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 77t(b), 78u, 78u-2, 78u-3, 78v, 80b-9 (2012).
142. Rakoff, supra note 139, at 7–8.
143. Id. at 11.
144. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Rules of Practice for Administrative
Proceedings (July 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-142.html.
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persons subject to SEC administrative proceedings, but it does not
address the more substantive concern about the SEC’s decision to
use the administrative procedure in the first place. Following the
criticism by Judge Rakoff and a subsequent article in the Wall Street
Journal, the SEC published a memorandum describing its rationale
for deciding where to bring proceedings.145 However, this did not
address Judge Rakoff’s substantive concern. In fact, the SEC an-
nounced that in order to achieve “fair, consistent, and effective
resolution of securities law issues and matters,” its policy where
a contested matter is likely to raise unsettled and complex le-
gal issues under the federal securities laws, or interpretation of
the Commission’s rules, consideration should be given to
whether, in light of the Commission’s expertise concerning
those matters, obtaining a Commission decision on such is-
sues, subject to appellate review in the federal courts, may
facilitate development of the law.146
This was precisely the point Judge Rakoff warned against, and for-
mer senior SEC personnel have suggested the SEC should instead
“develop objective criteria to guide the choice of forum.”147
By relying on the development of the law as a factor in determin-
ing the appropriate forum, the SEC is creating an issue sounding in
fundamental rule of law principles regarding fairness in adjudica-
tions and certainty of the law.148 The decision-making of the SEC is
naturally influenced by its interpretation of statutes, rules, and reg-
ulations, but in deciding to choose the administrative forum in
order to develop the law, the implication is that the SEC seeks to go
further.
145. William McLucas & Matthew Martens, Opinion, How to Rein in the SEC, WALL STREET
J. (June 2, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-rein-in-the-sec-1433285747
(“On May 7, The Wall Street Journal reported that the SEC has a ‘home-court advantage’
and ‘won against 90% of defendants before its own judges in contested cases from October
2010 through March of this year.’ The next day, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement issued a
four-page memo identifying criteria for selecting one forum versus the other.”); see also SEC,
DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO FORUM SELECTION IN CONTESTED CASES, http://www.
sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-approach-forum-selection-contested-actions.pdf.
146. SEC, supra note 145 (emphasis added).
147. McLucas & Martens, supra note 145 (suggesting that the SEC should develop objec-
tive criteria).
148. See, e.g., Robert A. Stein, The Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY
13 (Robert A. Stein & Richard J. Goldstone consulting eds., 2015) (“[T]he law must be
known and predictable so that persons will know the consequences of their actions. The law
must be sufficiently defined and government discretion sufficiently limited to ensure the law
is applied in a non-arbitrary manner.”).
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There is a danger of upsetting the current balance of interpreta-
tion between the SEC and the courts. In general, Congress,
through the APA, determined that the courts would have the upper
hand in interpretation by providing that a reviewing court shall set
aside agency conclusions found to be “not in accordance with the
law.”149 The courts modified this approach by allowing agency ex-
pertise to play a greater role in certain circumstances; if Congress
has delegated broadly to an agency and left ambiguity in a statute,
the courts will grant deference based on the Chevron doctrine.150
This doctrine is not, however, without limitation. It is unclear
whether SEC determinations made in adjudicatory proceedings are
entitled to such deference,151 and courts may grant less deference
where an agency’s position has changed over time.152
Therefore, another implication of the SEC’s suggestion that it is
appropriate to choose the administrative forum in order to develop
the law is that the agency’s interpretation of the law should be fa-
vored more broadly than it already is under the APA and the
Chevron doctrine. The SEC’s internal policy on forum selection is
not the appropriate method to create this shift. As noted by the
district court in Chau, any decision regarding the “proper or wise
allocation of interpretive functions between the Commission and
the courts . . . are policy matters committed to the legislative and
executive branches of government.”153
A counter example—where an ALJ has pushed back on the
SEC’s insider trading theories on the basis of Second Circuit prece-
dent—may illustrate this point. One actionable theory of insider
trading occurs where (1) an insider gives a tip of material non-pub-
lic information to another person (the “tippee”) in breach of a
fiduciary duty, (2) the tippee knows or should know of the insider’s
breach of duty, and (3) the tippee uses that information to trade,
thus participating in the insider’s breach.154 This theory has been
used in criminal and civil insider trading cases relating to tipping
chains (involving an insider, one or more tippers, and an end
trader), which can present difficult evidentiary questions. In recent
years a legal question has also arisen—what precisely must the
149. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
150. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NDRC, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding that in the
case of silence or ambiguity “the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute . . . the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute”).
151. See, e.g., Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 436 n.157 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting conflict
between Second Circuit decisions on this point).
152. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2378 (2001).
153. Chau, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 436–37.
154. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659–61 (1983).
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trader know about the insider’s breach of duty? In 2014, the Second
Circuit held the trader must know the insider disclosed confidential
information and that he did so in exchange for a “personal bene-
fit.”155 There has been some tension between the Second and Ninth
Circuits over the definition of that term, which the Supreme Court
has recently addressed to some extent.156
The controversy seeped into the SEC’s administrative proceed-
ings, and ALJs have had to grapple with the different judicial
decisions, which have diverged from the SEC’s theories.157 In the
case of Ruggieri, an SEC ALJ found the SEC’s Enforcement Division
had not satisfied its burden of establishing that Ruggieri had been
tipped for a personal benefit, on the ALJ’s interpretation of the
Second Circuit’s decision in Newman.158 The ALJ dismissed the pro-
ceedings against Ruggieri, and the Division of Enforcement filed a
petition for review of the ALJ’s initial decision with the Commis-
sion, one ground of challenge being the ALJ’s interpretation of the
law.159 A decision by the Commission following its review is still
awaited as this Note goes to print, but this case highlights the SEC’s
willingness to use the ALJ forum to pursue development of the law
even where it can be interpreted as conflicting with judicial
precedent.
Shifting the balance in favor of the SEC also implicates problems
of transparency and accountability by effectively moving additional
policymaking responsibility into the agency without clear delega-
tion or mandate. Although the SEC’s expertise means that it may
be best suited to evaluate and advise on policy decisions, it is possi-
ble to criticize the role of bureaucratic experts as decision makers
on policy questions. For example, Justice Kagan has written that
“[b]ureaucracy is the ultimate black box of government,” and that
155. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d. Cir. 2014).
156. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (resolving a narrow issue, the
Court explained that to the extent the Second Circuit sought to impose an additional re-
quirement that a tipper must receive something of a “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature”
in exchange for a gift to family or friends, that requirement was inconsistent with earlier
Supreme Court precedent).
157. Joseph C. Ruggieri, Initial Decision Release No. 877, 2015 WL 5316569 (Sept. 14,
2015).
158. Id.; Joseph C. Ruggieri, Order Denying Motion for Summary Affirmance, Granting
Petitions for Review, and Scheduling Briefs, Administrative Proceedings File No. 3-16178,
Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 9985, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 76614
(Dec. 10, 2015).
159. Joseph C. Ruggieri, Order Denying Motion for Summary Affirmance, supra note 158,
at 1–2.
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“agency experts have neither democratic warrant, nor special com-
petence to make the value judgments—the essentially political
choices—that underlie most administrative policymaking.”160
The SEC has also been strongly criticized for pursuing novel the-
ories by Mark Cuban, who was himself investigated for insider
trading.161 Cuban emphasized the monetary and personal costs of
defending protracted proceedings in amicus briefs filed with the
Supreme Court in connection with Bebo’s petition for certiorari,
and in connection with the insider trading case heard in October
2016.162 Cuban argues that there is a risk that where the SEC pur-
sues novel insider trading theories, individuals may be tempted to
settle with the SEC even if they do not believe they violated the law,
rather than “mount an expensive and time-consuming defense that
is likely to take years to resolve.”163 This risk is heightened where
the SEC proceeds through its internal administrative process. Cu-
ban points out that he was fortunate enough to be able to afford to
defend himself.164 His case was heard in district court, and he was
able to bring a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the district
court, but vacated and remanded by the Fifth Circuit.165 Ultimately,
he was found not guilty following a jury trial.166 This example illus-
trates that insider trading is a particularly relevant category,
implicating the concern over the SEC’s ability to develop the law
through novel theories.
In summary, the SEC should remove the development of the law
as one of its criteria in favor of pursuing administrative proceedings
for reasons of fairness, consistency, and maintaining the balance of
interpretation between the agency and the courts. If not persuaded
by this reasoning, the SEC should change its position as a matter of
pragmatism—to fend off some of the criticism and the level of chal-
lenge it currently faces.
160. Kagan, supra note 152, at 2378, 2353.
161. Brief for Mark Cuban as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Salman v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (No. 15-628).
162. Brief for Mark Cuban as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Bebo v. SEC, 799
F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1500 (2016) (No. 15-997); Brief for Mark
Cuban, supra note 161, at 1.
163. Brief for Mark Cuban, supra note 161, at 1.
164. Id.
165. SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 552–53, 558 (5th Cir. 2010).
166. Brief for Mark Cuban, supra note 161, at 1.
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B. Right of removal for fraud
Challengers seeking to question the SEC’s exercise of discretion
in choosing the forum face a high threshold. Challenges based on
equal protection arguments have generally failed, except in the
most acute case. In Gupta v. SEC, Rajat Gupta challenged the SEC’s
decision to issue an internal Order Instituting Public Administrative
and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, which alleged he had knowingly
disclosed material, non-public information to Raj Rajaratnam, prin-
cipal of Galleon Management, LP (“Galleon”), who subsequently
traded on the basis of that inside information.167  This was one in a
long line of cases brought by the SEC in relation to the Galleon-
related insider-trading ring, and the SEC had previously filed com-
plaints against 28 other defendants in federal district court, alleging
similar violations of the federal securities laws and seeking similar
remedies.168 Gupta argued that the SEC had singled him out for
“uniquely unfavorable treatment in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Constitution.”169
The Court denied the SEC’s motion to dismiss, finding that it
had jurisdiction to hear Gupta’s equal protection claim, but noted
that fear of allowing diversionary tactics by subjects of SEC enforce-
ment actions in the future would be cabined by potential dismissal
for failure to state a claim under the Iqbal standard.170 The Court
pointed to the evidence supporting Gupta’s argument, stating that
there was “already a well-developed public record of Gupta being
treated substantially disparately from 28 essentially identical de-
fendants, with not even a hint from the SEC, even in their instant
papers, as to why this should be so.”171 The equal protection claim
was never decided, as the SEC subsequently filed a complaint
against Gupta in the district court.172 But the judgment suggests the
claim would have at least progressed beyond the motion to dismiss
stage, and would “turn entirely on extrinsic evidence of whether the
SEC’s decision to treat Gupta differently from the other Galleon-
related defendants was irrational, arbitrary, and discriminatory.”173
Therefore, there appears to be limited recourse for challengers
to object to the SEC’s discretion to determine which process it will
167. Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 514.
171. Id.
172. See SEC v. Gupta, 11 Civ. 7566 (JSR), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102274, at *1, 5 n.3 (July
17, 2013).
173. Gupta v. SEC, 796 F.Supp. 2d 503, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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follow. It has, however, been suggested that Congress should con-
sider providing a right of removal to individuals facing the SEC’s
administrative process in certain cases.174 Determining an appropri-
ate balance between retaining an administrative process that is
effective, reduces unnecessary burden on the federal courts, and
provides a fair procedure to those facing SEC proceedings is the
key question.
In opining on proposals for a right of removal, Professor
Grundfest has considered both (1) pending legislation which pro-
poses a right of removal in all cases in which the SEC proposes to
use its administrative proceedings to seek a cease and desist order
and financial penalty, and (2) an approach which attaches different
rights to distinct categories of cases.175 Under the latter approach,
he suggests a model where no right of removal would attach to
technical or pro forma cases, an unqualified right of removal would
attach to certain cases where Congress determined federal court
proceedings provide necessary safeguards, and a residual category
would exist in which parties would have the right to petition a fed-
eral court for a right of removal.176 This approach clearly strikes a
better balance than a blanket right of removal, which would render
the administrative process meaningless in significant cases.177
Categorizing those cases to which an unqualified right of re-
moval should attach would be the most difficult question for
Congress if it did adopt such an approach. Professor Grundfest sug-
gested that this category “might include alleged violations of the
insider trading laws or of the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act.”178
For the subjects of SEC investigations, there may be certain types
of allegations where the option of federal court and a jury determi-
nation is more relevant. It could be argued that specialist
administrative law judges are better equipped than a jury at han-
dling technical questions, but where allegations of fraud are made
by the SEC, the subject’s state of mind is under scrutiny and a jury
trial may be more appropriate.179
174. Joseph A. Grundfest, Fair or Foul? SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for Re-
form Through Removal Legislation 17–21 (Rock Center for Corporate Governance, Working
Paper Series 212, 2015). The Republican Party has indicated a plan to replace the Dodd-
Frank Act with legislation including an immediate right of removal for respondents in ad-
ministrative proceedings. Jeb Hensarling, Remarks to the Economic Club of New York (June
7, 2016), http://business.cch.com/srd/hensarling_ny_econ_club_speech_june_7_2016.pdf.
175. Grundfest, supra note 174, at 19–20.
176. Id. at 20.
177. Id. at 19.
178. Id. at 20.
179. Consistent with the jury’s traditional role in making these types of determinations.
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To illustrate the evidentiary burdens on the SEC in such cases,
consider Lucia, where the SEC found violations of the anti-fraud
provisions of the Investment Advisers Act.180 The case arose from
presentations of a “Buckets of Money” investment strategy given at
retirement planning seminars.181 In order to support its conclusion
that a violation had occurred, the SEC had to demonstrate (i) that
misleading statements were made (either because there was a mis-
statement or an omission of a fact necessary to clarify the
statement), (ii) that those misstatements or omissions were mate-
rial, and (iii) that those statements were made with scienter.182
“Scienter” is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate
or defraud.183 This element may also be satisfied by demonstrating
“extreme recklessness,” which can incorporate what the respondent
knew or should have known.184 This is “not merely a heightened
form of ordinary negligence but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care . . . which presents a danger of mislead-
ing buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.”185 On review, the
D.C. Circuit held that the record provided substantial evidence to
support the SEC’s determination.186 Specifically, the petitioners
knew certain facts about the assumptions made in their analyses
that were not disclosed to investors.187 The SEC determined this
presented an obvious risk of misleading investors.188
However, this example highlights different ways of establishing
scienter in a fraud case—through intent, knowledge, or obvi-
ousness of risk. At an abstract level, these questions tend to involve
more difficult or close evidentiary questions. Therefore, arguments
relating to the need for the federal rules of evidence to govern ad-
missibility, and the option of having a jury to make determinations
of credibility, are at their most relevant where allegations of fraud
are at play.
These procedural aspects have protective qualities. For example,
the rules of evidence applicable in district court can operate to ex-
clude pieces of evidence that might be helpful to the SEC in a fraud
case, including character evidence, which might be used to show a
180. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
181. Id. at 282.
182. Id. at 290.
183. Id. at 294.
184. Id.
185. Id. (internal citations omitted).
186. Id. at 293–94.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 294.
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propensity for dishonesty.189 Evidence of prior bad acts would also
be excluded if relied on for the same purpose.190 Similarly, if the
SEC brought a case in district court and the defendant testified,
there are rules that govern how the defendant’s credibility as a wit-
ness could be challenged.191 The court could also consider whether
unfair prejudice, confusion, or undue delay that might ensue from
items of evidence the SEC might seek to admit.192
It could be argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be
extended to cover SEC ALJ proceedings. SEC ALJs do not, however,
have day-to-day experience with considering evidentiary motions,
and there may be limited prospect of evidentiary rulings being ana-
lyzed in detail by the Commission on review of an ALJ’s decision.
In the wake of criticism over its use of ALJs, the SEC did amend
its rules of practice, such that the SEC must now consider the relia-
bility of evidence and may only admit hearsay evidence if it is
relevant, material, and reliable.193 But this reform does not provide
equivalent protections to those available to defendants facing the
SEC’s claims in district court, such as the rules of evidence dis-
cussed above. Allegations of fraud also give rise to more acute
reputational concerns, and so allowing these additional protections
for investigation subjects could be the most effective change in pro-
cedure in terms of limiting challenges to the SEC’s administrative
process.
There are parallels in other proceedings that also support pro-
viding the option of a jury trial in cases where fraud is at issue. For
example, in proceedings in federal court, allegations of fraud must
be pleaded with particularity.194 It is also interesting to draw a com-
parison between the use of jury trials in the U.S. and England; the
influence of clause 39 of the Magna Carta, guaranteeing that no
person “will be imprisoned . . . or in any way ruined . . . save by
judgment of his peers and the law of the land,” gave rise to a right
to a jury trial in specific circumstances (civil and criminal) in both
189. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
190. Id.
191. See FED. R. EVID. 608, 609.
192. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
193. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Rules of Practice for Administrative
Proceedings (July 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-142.html.
194. FED. R. CIV. P 9(b). This applies both to private civil actions and to those brought by
the SEC. See, e.g., SEC v. One or More Unknown Traders in the Secs. of Onyx Pharms., Inc.,
13-CV-4645 (JPO), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137448, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2014) (alleging
insider trading); SEC v. Garber, 959 F. Supp. 2d 374, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (alleging fraudu-
lent penny stock scheme); SEC v. Morton, 10 Civ. 1720 (LAK) (MHD), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36487, at *56–57 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011) (alleging fraudulent misrepresentations in
connection with an investment scheme).
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jurisdictions.195 Acts of the legislature in both jurisdictions can,
however, determine the extent of the right to a jury trial—in En-
gland owing to principles of parliamentary sovereignty, and in the
U.S. through acts of Congress interpreted in accordance with the
Seventh Amendment.196 The trend in the UK has been to narrow
significantly the circumstances in which a jury trial is available,197
but interestingly the right to a jury trial in civil cases involving alle-
gations of fraud remains.198 Attempts by the government to remove
the right in cases of complex criminal fraud cases have been de-
feated in Parliament (by the House of Lords), reflecting concerns
about the protection of individual liberty and also questions over
the availability of inadmissible evidence to the judge ruling on the
case.199 The latter concern is equally relevant to persons facing alle-
gations of fraud by the SEC.
Therefore, individuals facing SEC administrative proceedings
should be guaranteed a right of removal in cases involving fraud
allegations. This is similar to Professor Grundfest’s suggestion, as
this proposal would include insider-trading cases, which he had
identified as a relevant category for removal.200 This category is par-
ticularly sensitive due to recent controversy over the elements
required to demonstrate a violation in some circumstances. An in-
sider trading case also illustrates the point regarding difficult
questions of evidence arising where fraud allegations are made. In
Ruggieri, discussed above at Part II.A, the SEC’s Division of Enforce-
ment also sought review of the ALJ’s initial decision on a factual
195. Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Magna Carta and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF
LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 63 (Robert A. Stein and Richard J. Goldstone, consulting eds.,
2015).
196. See id. at 66. As to the U.S. position, see Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1315 (N.D.
Ga. 2015) (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430
U.S. 442, 460 (1977)) (“[T]he United States could . . . validly opt for administrative enforce-
ment, without judicial trials.”).
197. See Michael J. Beloff QC, Magna Carta in the Twentieth and Twenty First Centuries, 27
DENNING L.J. 1, 19–21 (2015). The first criminal trial of a serious offence without a jury in
England was approved in 2009, pursuant to powers under sections 44 and 46 of the Criminal
Justice Act 2003 c.44, which allows for trial by judge alone where there is a real and present
danger of jury tampering. First Trial Without Jury Approved, BBC NEWS (June 18, 2009, 6:19
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8106590.stm.
198. Senior Courts Act 1981 c. 54 § 69(1), this is subject to judicial discretion where “the
court is of the opinion that the trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or
accounts or any scientific or local investigation which cannot conveniently be made with a
jury.”
199. 20 Mar. 2007 Parl Deb HL 2007 col. 1149–50 (Lord Goldsmith, explaining attempts
to pass an affirmative resolution of both Houses); 20 Mar. 2007 Parl Deb HL 2007 col.
1152–55 (Lord Kingsland, explaining the arguments against removing the right to a jury trial
in complex fraud cases).
200. See Brief for Mark Cuban, supra note 161, at 1.
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basis, arguing that the ALJ “drew impermissible inferences from the
facts, including that [the tipper]—risking his career—repeatedly
tipped Ruggieri to valuable inside information without any expecta-
tion of receiving a benefit in return.”201 Difficulties in drawing
inferences over a person’s state of mind affect respondents and the
SEC alike.
The proposed right of removal for fraud cases could also include
certain allegations relating to bribery (as suggested by Professor
Grundfest), although the administrative procedure is normally
used by the SEC to impose sanctions following a settlement offer in
the anti-bribery context, where a right of removal would not be
relevant.202
But the proposal would include other cases, for example, those
involving allegations of fraudulent misstatements made to inves-
tors.203 So a case such as Lucia would be included in the proposal,
and in a future case, a respondent would have the right to remove
to federal court.
The proposal would ensure cases involving allegations of fraud—
which bring with them greater reputational risks, potentially re-
quire the most difficult evidentiary calls, and where questions of
admissibility may be at their most acute—would be dealt with in a
fairer way, by giving the respondent the choice of forum.
C. Disclosure obligations
As discussed above, limitations on the ability of respondents in
administrative proceedings to use discovery mechanisms that would
be available in federal court is one of the criticisms raised by chal-
lengers to the SEC’s use of ALJs. The SEC counters that its
disclosure obligations are sufficient, as it is required to produce
“documents obtained by the Division prior to the institution of pro-
ceedings, in connection with the investigation leading to the
Division’s recommendation to institute proceedings,”204 including
201. Joseph C. Ruggieri, Order Denying Motion for Summary Affirmance, supra note 158,
at 2 (internal citations omitted).
202. See, e.g., Jose Hurtado, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-17232; Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 Release No. 77729 (April 27, 2016), 2016 SEC LEXIS 1656.
203. See, e.g., James A. Winkelman Sr. and Blue Ocean Portfolios, LLC, Administrative
Proceeding File No. 3-17253, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 10080; Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Release No. 77862; Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 4389; Investment
Company Act of 1940 Release No. 32118 (May 19, 2016), 2016 SEC LEXIS 1892.
204. 17 C.F.R. §201.230(a)(1) (2004).
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all Brady and Jencks Act material (in other words, exculpatory evi-
dence and witness evidence).205  The range of documents disclosed
by the SEC is therefore broad.
Two issues do arise from the SEC’s disclosure obligations. First,
the SEC may obtain and disclose a vast amount of data and docu-
ments, creating problems both for recipients of SEC subpoenas and
subjects of SEC ALJ proceedings. This issue has been raised in the
current challenges to the ALJ process; for example Chau featured
complaints about the SEC’s production of 22 million documents.206
In that case, plaintiffs argued that “SEC Rule 230, governing the
production of documents, was defective because it allegedly permit-
ted the SEC to produce documents in an unorganized and
unsearchable manner.”207 In this case, however, the ALJ was unsym-
pathetic: “Given the manner in which the Division has produced
the investigative files . . . and given the representations the Division
has made regarding them, Respondents should be able to meaning-
fully prioritize their review.”208 The objections were dismissed by
the ALJ and the court.209 But even if the manner of disclosure al-
lows for searches of relevant material by the subjects of
proceedings, there is a broader concern of inefficiency in the docu-
ment gathering process. Critics have raised this issue against the
SEC, owing to the costs of securing, producing, and reviewing docu-
ments, which will be incurred whether or not the SEC subsequently
takes action. For example, in a proposal for reform of the SEC’s
investigation process, the Center for Capital Markets Competitive-
ness suggested a pressing need to improve efficiency: “[w]hen one
recognizes that the vast majority of SEC investigations are closed
without action, it means that companies that have done nothing
wrong have been required to produce tens of millions of irrelevant
documents, at a substantial cost to the company.”210
Second, there is no positive duty on the SEC to identify docu-
ments material to its case, or helpful to the subject of
205. Examining the SEC’s Agenda, Operations, and FY 2016 Budget Request, Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 114th Cong. 25 (2015) (evidence of Mary Jo White, SEC
Chair); 17 C.F.R §201.230(a)(1)(iv) (requiring disclosure of transcripts and other docu-
ments); 17 C.F.R §201.230(b)(2) (providing that the SEC cannot “withhold, contrary to the
doctrine of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), documents that contain material ex-
culpatory evidence.”).
206. See Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing ALJ decision).
209. Id.
210. CENTER FOR CAPITAL MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS, EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES AND
PRACTICES 41–42 (2015).
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investigation.211 This causes an issue because, where the amount of
material disclosed is voluminous, as in Chau, this creates unfairness
to respondents who will have a limited time available for review.
As noted above, the SEC is obliged to provide a broad amount of
disclosure—producing “documents obtained . . . in connection
with the investigation”212—without needing to categorize the mate-
rial. This can be compared with the more specific requirements
used in another regime, by the UK financial services regulators,
who are required to allow persons against whom they take action
access to two categories of material: “the material on which it relied
in taking the decision [to take action],” and material considered or
obtained by the regulator, which, “in the regulator’s opinion, might
undermine that decision.”213
As a practical matter, this puts the onus on the regulator to make
determinations about the material it considered or obtained during
the course of its investigation. The greater the amount of material
obtained, the more onerous these determinations become. There
are many ways to structure an investigation and the approach used
will vary depending on the circumstances of the case. This Note
does not suggest disclosure obligations are a driving factor in that
regard. But in the absence of an obligation to make such a determi-
nation, there is no check on requiring the production of vast
swathes of material, rather than taking a more focused approach.
Placing an affirmative duty on the SEC to specifically identify the
evidence obtained during the course of its investigation which (1) is
material to the SEC’s case, or (2) might tend to undermine the
SEC’s case, would enhance the fairness of the SEC’s proceedings.
The threshold for materiality could be evidence upon which the
SEC relied in making its decision to institute proceedings. The
threshold for the latter category would need to be low to avoid the
SEC taking a narrow interpretation of what might be undermin-
ing.214 Retaining the broad disclosure obligation that the SEC
already has would leave it open for respondents to challenge the
211. See David F. Bandimere & John O. Young, Administrative Proceedings Release No.
759, 2013 SEC LEXIS 746, at *1, *3 (Mar. 12, 2013).
212. See supra note 204.
213. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8 § 394(1), (6) (Eng.).
214. This is especially the case considering the SEC’s interpretation of what constitutes
Brady material may be narrower than that of other agencies. Justin Goetz, Note, Hold Fast the
Keys to the Kingdom: Federal Administrative Agencies and the Need for Brady Disclosure, 95 MINN. L.
REV., 1424, 1436–37 (contrasting the prohibition on the SEC from withholding “material
exculpatory evidence” with the CFTC’s more generous approach of disclosing “any informa-
tion that is either favorable to the respondent’s theory of the case or would tend to
undermine the Division’s case”).
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SEC’s determinations, ensuring that the SEC would act with care in
the review and selection of potentially undermining documents.
If the SEC had such an affirmative duty in its rules of practice,
enforcement staff would need to consider their obligations during
the document gathering process and ensure an appropriate review
of material prior to commencing proceedings. This would limit
overly broad requests for documents and other material, as enforce-
ment staff would need to consider the process for reviewing the
material in detail during the course of the investigation. This ap-
proach would not hinder the SEC’s enforcement efforts. The SEC’s
powers to require documents would not be curtailed, even though
a more modest method of document gathering would hopefully be
encouraged. Investigators could choose to target key documents in
the first instance, seeking incremental productions to expand their
searches. Additionally, requiring preservation of broader categories
of documents reduces the possibility of evidence being lost or
destroyed.
III. CONCLUSION
Constitutional challenges to SEC ALJs will be considered further
in due course, potentially by other circuit courts, or by the Supreme
Court if it is asked to resolve the split between the Tenth and D.C.
Circuits. The highest potential for success comes from the argu-
ment that SEC ALJs are inferior officers appointed in violation of
Article II. If courts do reach that determination, the consequences
will be felt not only by the SEC, but potentially by other administra-
tive agencies. The government has refused to act to change the
appointments process, even with knowledge of the widespread un-
certainty this creates. Combined with criticism over the fairness of
administrative proceedings at the SEC and the SEC’s policy that it
will use administrative proceedings to develop the law in novel and
complex cases, this still presents a significant risk for the SEC in the
medium term. Recent changes to the rules governing the conduct
of SEC ALJ proceedings do not go far enough, and the SEC would
be advised to implement a modified approach to forum selection to
stave off further criticism and challenges in order to shore up its
credibility in exercising its discretion to pursue cases in-house. The
SEC should also implement further procedural safeguards. Respon-
dents to SEC proceedings should be guaranteed a right of removal
to federal district court where allegations of fraud are at issue. Fi-
nally, the process for providing investigation material should be
revised by establishing an affirmative duty in the SEC’s rules of
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practice to specifically identify evidence obtained during the course
of its investigation that is either material or potentially undermin-
ing to the SEC’s case. This would enhance the fairness of the SEC’s
administrative proceedings and, in the longer term, would improve
the efficiency of SEC investigations.
